Buaya v. Polo

Facts:

Solemnidad M. Buaya ("Buaya") was an agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC). Audit of her account revealed that she failed to remit insurance premiums amounting to Php 358,850.72. Consequently, she was charged with estafa before Branch XIX of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The information against her states that, "That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation..."

Buaya filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Her motion for reconsideration being similarly denied, Buaya filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.


Arguments of the Petitioner

Buaya argues that the funds she allegedly embezzled were collected in Cebu City. Hence, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case.


Issue

Whether or not the Manila RTC had jurisdiction to try the case.


Held

Yes. The information filed against Buaya alleges that the crime was committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines". Moreover, damage to CBIC, an essential element of estafa, took place in Manila.


Ratio

In the case of People v. Mission (87 Phil. 641), the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after trial. In relation to this, Rule 110, Section 14 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in criminal prosecutions, the action must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense or any of the essential elements of the same took place.

Moreover, estafa is a continuing or transitory crime which may be prosecuted in any place where any of its essential elements took place. Damage or prejudice to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. In this case, the damage or prejudice done to the CBIC took place in its principal office, which is in Manila.

Annesley v. Annesley

Facts

Sybil Annesley ("Annesley"), a British subject, was married to a British domiciliary. The spouses resided in France until the death of the husband. Annesley remained in France without taking the steps set forth under French law for the formal acquisition of domicile in that country and seldom returned to Britain until her death. She left a will executed in France but in British form bequeathing her estate to her daughter. By French law, Annesley is not a domiciliary of France, but by British law, Annesley is a domiciliary of France. By the laws of France, the estate of Annesley is governed by the laws of her nationality, but by the laws of Britain, the estate of Annesley is governed by the laws of the domicile. French law only allows the testator to freely dispose of one-third of her estate.

Issue

Whether or not the succession is governed by French law.

Held

Yes. French law governs.

Ratio

Notwithstanding the lack of a formal French domicile, Annesley is a French domiciliary by British law given the concurrence of actual residence in a foreign jurisdiction coupled with the intent to remain there.  Thus, French law refers the matter to English law which, in turn, will refer the matter back to French law. Consequently, in these circumstances, French law dictates that French courts will apply the domestic law. Hence, French law governs the succession and Annesley may only dispose of one-third of her estate.

Aznar v. Garcia

Facts

Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the testator to dispose of his estate in any manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that the personal property of a person is governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed the project of partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed in the project deprived her of her legitime.

Issue

Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

Held

Yes. Philippine law governs.

Ratio

Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.

In Re: Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster

Facts
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the India passed a law giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster. As thus, the Indian government filed a complaint before a New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality. The district court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court, provided it complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in India. The UCC appealed the conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant
While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards of due process much lower than that followed in the US. Hence, US courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held
Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who have revoked their representation by an American counsel in favor of the Indian government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and evidence are likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian courts as alternate fora. The second is problematic as it gives the impression that foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of the Indian courts to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a judgment rendered by a foreign court may be enforced in that State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of Indian courts is untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of due process may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties must be given equal access to evidence in each other's possession. Hence, both parties maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

Heine v. New York Life Insurance Company

Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance companies") were corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to agree to be supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may be served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US and Germany for the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff
As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice but to try the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the insurance companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to great and unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of having to bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which arose from another jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.

Sievert v. Court of Appeals

Facts

Alberto Sievert ("Sievert") received by mail a Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment, despite not having previously received any summons or any copy of a complaint. Sievert's counsel appeared before the court to question its jurisdiction over Sievert's person. The trial court denied Sievert's objections and proceeded to hear the application.

Issue

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sievert.

Held

No.

Ratio Decidendi

A preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy. Hence, the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the principal action would necessarily mean that it likewise lacks such jurisdiction in the ancillary proceeding. In this case, jurisdiction has not been acquired over Sievert in the principal action as no summons has been served upon him. Hence, it was an error for the trial court to proceed with the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary attachment.

Davao Light v. Court of Appeals

Facts

The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12 May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of the defendants.

Issue

Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

Held

Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Ratio Decidendi
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of time between the commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose of the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his properties before the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it. In any case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is matched by the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a preliminary attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though validly issued, is not binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is first acquired.