Showing posts with label Remedial Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Remedial Law. Show all posts

Monday, August 28, 2017

Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. v. Tan

Facts

On 28 August 1996, a vehicular accident occurred on the Davao-Agusan Road in Davao City in which a truck owned by the Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. ("MRCMI") rear-ended a car owned by the spouses Manuel and Annie Tan ("the Tan spouses"). Consequently, the Tan spouses demanded reimbursement from the MRCMI of the costs for the repair of their vehicle. The MRCMI, however, refused to pay.

Consequently, the Tan spouses sued the MRCMI for damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City. During trial, the parties present two (2) different versions of how the accident transpired. The Tan spouses alleged that their car was stopped in traffic along with other vehicles when the MRCMI's truck crashed into its rear portion. On the other hand the MRCMI asserted that the Tan spouses' car suddenly cut in front of its truck, which was unable to stop in time as a result.

Ruling of the Trial Court: After trial, the MTCC awarded the Tan spouses PhP 83,750.00 for the damage done to their vehicle; PhP 15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of the suit.

Ruling of the Appellate Courts: Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Davao City and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the ruling of the MTCC.

Hence, the MRCMI file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.


Issues

(1) [Remedial Law] Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy; and

(2) [Torts and Damages] Whether or not the MRCMI is liable for treble costs.


Held

(1) No. The case under consideration does not raise purely questions of law.

(2) Yes. The present action is a frivolous suit justifying the imposition of treble costs.


Ratio

(1) Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that petitions for certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.

In the present case, the matter elevated for review was the determination of the real cause of the collision between the Tan spouses' car and the MRCMI's truck, which is a question of fact, not of law. Jurisprudence has recognized a number of exceptions to Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, including when:

1. The findings of the lower courts are ground entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

2. Inferences made by the lower courts are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

3. There is grave abuse of discretion;

4. The judgment of the lower courts is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. The factual determinations of the lower courts are conflicting;


6. In making its findings, the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case or such findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;



7. The findings are contrary to those of the trial court;


8. The factual findings made by the lower courts were made without citation of the specific evidence on which they are made;

9. The facts set forth in the Petition, as well as in the Petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the Respondent;

10. The findings of fact are based on a supposed lack of evidence, which are in fact present;

11. The lower courts overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

(2) Rule 142, Section 3 of the Rules of Court reads:


Section 3. Cost when appeal frivolous. — Where an action or appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble cost may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.

A frivolous appeal is one where no error can be brought before the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and the arguments of error are totally bereft of merit, or which is prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change. It is frivolous, too, when it does not present any justiciable question, or is one so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can succeed.

In the present case all three (3) lower courts unanimously upheld the police report placing the responsibility for the collision on the part of the MRCMI. However, despite its obvious fault, the MRCMI insisted on pressing its case, to the point of elevating the factual question of liability to the Supreme Court. Hence, the action was frivolous and award of treble costs is in order.

Other instances when the court may award treble costs include:

1. To stress dislike for "any scheme to prolong litigation" or for "an unwarranted effort to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at;";

2. To sanction an appeal that was obviously interposed "for the sole purpose of delay;"

3. To disapprove of the party’s "lack of good and honest intentions, as well as the evasive manner by which it was able to frustrate the adverse party’s claim for a decade;"

4. To stifle a party’s deplorable propensity to "go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court" and thereby to cause the case to drag "for far too long with practically no end in sight;"

5. To condemn the counsel’s frantic search for "any ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause;" and

6. To reiterate that a litigant, although his right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, is not permitted to initiate similar suits once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, in the hope of securing a favorable ruling "for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice."

Monday, February 1, 2016

Sievert v. Court of Appeals

Facts
Alberto Sievert ("Sievert") received by mail a Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment, despite not having previously received any summons or any copy of a complaint. Sievert's counsel appeared before the court to question its jurisdiction over Sievert's person. The trial court denied Sievert's objections and proceeded to hear the application.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sievert.

Held
No.

Ratio Decidendi
A preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy. Hence, the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the principal action would necessarily mean that it likewise lacks such jurisdiction in the ancillary proceeding. In this case, jurisdiction has not been acquired over Sievert in the principal action as no summons has been served upon him. Hence, it was an error for the trial court to proceed with the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary attachment.

Davao Light v. Court of Appeals

Facts
The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12 May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of the defendants.

Issue
Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

Held
Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Ratio Decidendi
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of time between the commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose of the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his properties before the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it. In any case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is matched by the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a preliminary attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though validly issued, is not binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is first acquired.