Monday, August 28, 2017

Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. v. Tan

Facts

On 28 August 1996, a vehicular accident occurred on the Davao-Agusan Road in Davao City in which a truck owned by the Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. ("MRCMI") rear-ended a car owned by the spouses Manuel and Annie Tan ("the Tan spouses"). Consequently, the Tan spouses demanded reimbursement from the MRCMI of the costs for the repair of their vehicle. The MRCMI, however, refused to pay.

Consequently, the Tan spouses sued the MRCMI for damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City. During trial, the parties present two (2) different versions of how the accident transpired. The Tan spouses alleged that their car was stopped in traffic along with other vehicles when the MRCMI's truck crashed into its rear portion. On the other hand the MRCMI asserted that the Tan spouses' car suddenly cut in front of its truck, which was unable to stop in time as a result.

Ruling of the Trial Court: After trial, the MTCC awarded the Tan spouses PhP 83,750.00 for the damage done to their vehicle; PhP 15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of the suit.

Ruling of the Appellate Courts: Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Davao City and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the ruling of the MTCC.

Hence, the MRCMI file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.


Issues

(1) [Remedial Law] Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy; and

(2) [Torts and Damages] Whether or not the MRCMI is liable for treble costs.


Held

(1) No. The case under consideration does not raise purely questions of law.

(2) Yes. The present action is a frivolous suit justifying the imposition of treble costs.


Ratio

(1) Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that petitions for certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.

In the present case, the matter elevated for review was the determination of the real cause of the collision between the Tan spouses' car and the MRCMI's truck, which is a question of fact, not of law. Jurisprudence has recognized a number of exceptions to Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, including when:

1. The findings of the lower courts are ground entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

2. Inferences made by the lower courts are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

3. There is grave abuse of discretion;

4. The judgment of the lower courts is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. The factual determinations of the lower courts are conflicting;


6. In making its findings, the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case or such findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;



7. The findings are contrary to those of the trial court;


8. The factual findings made by the lower courts were made without citation of the specific evidence on which they are made;

9. The facts set forth in the Petition, as well as in the Petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the Respondent;

10. The findings of fact are based on a supposed lack of evidence, which are in fact present;

11. The lower courts overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

(2) Rule 142, Section 3 of the Rules of Court reads:


Section 3. Cost when appeal frivolous. — Where an action or appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble cost may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.

A frivolous appeal is one where no error can be brought before the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and the arguments of error are totally bereft of merit, or which is prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change. It is frivolous, too, when it does not present any justiciable question, or is one so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can succeed.

In the present case all three (3) lower courts unanimously upheld the police report placing the responsibility for the collision on the part of the MRCMI. However, despite its obvious fault, the MRCMI insisted on pressing its case, to the point of elevating the factual question of liability to the Supreme Court. Hence, the action was frivolous and award of treble costs is in order.

Other instances when the court may award treble costs include:

1. To stress dislike for "any scheme to prolong litigation" or for "an unwarranted effort to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at;";

2. To sanction an appeal that was obviously interposed "for the sole purpose of delay;"

3. To disapprove of the party’s "lack of good and honest intentions, as well as the evasive manner by which it was able to frustrate the adverse party’s claim for a decade;"

4. To stifle a party’s deplorable propensity to "go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court" and thereby to cause the case to drag "for far too long with practically no end in sight;"

5. To condemn the counsel’s frantic search for "any ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause;" and

6. To reiterate that a litigant, although his right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, is not permitted to initiate similar suits once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, in the hope of securing a favorable ruling "for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice."

Friday, March 24, 2017

US v. Dorr

Facts


Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of the aforementioned acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as "rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt".


Issue

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292.


Held

No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of specific individuals.


Ratio Decidendi

N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion.

As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the  Civil Commission and some of its individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292.




Saturday, January 21, 2017

Buaya v. Polo

Facts:

Solemnidad M. Buaya ("Buaya") was an agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC). Audit of her account revealed that she failed to remit insurance premiums amounting to Php 358,850.72. Consequently, she was charged with estafa before Branch XIX of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The information against her states that, "That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation..."

Buaya filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Her motion for reconsideration being similarly denied, Buaya filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.


Arguments of the Petitioner

Buaya argues that the funds she allegedly embezzled were collected in Cebu City. Hence, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case.


Issue

Whether or not the Manila RTC had jurisdiction to try the case.


Held

Yes. The information filed against Buaya alleges that the crime was committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines". Moreover, damage to CBIC, an essential element of estafa, took place in Manila.


Ratio

In the case of People v. Mission (87 Phil. 641), the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after trial. In relation to this, Rule 110, Section 14 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in criminal prosecutions, the action must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense or any of the essential elements of the same took place.

Moreover, estafa is a continuing or transitory crime which may be prosecuted in any place where any of its essential elements took place. Damage or prejudice to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. In this case, the damage or prejudice done to the CBIC took place in its principal office, which is in Manila.