Sievert v. Court of Appeals

Facts

Alberto Sievert ("Sievert") received by mail a Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment, despite not having previously received any summons or any copy of a complaint. Sievert's counsel appeared before the court to question its jurisdiction over Sievert's person. The trial court denied Sievert's objections and proceeded to hear the application.

Issue

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sievert.

Held

No.

Ratio Decidendi

A preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy. Hence, the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the principal action would necessarily mean that it likewise lacks such jurisdiction in the ancillary proceeding. In this case, jurisdiction has not been acquired over Sievert in the principal action as no summons has been served upon him. Hence, it was an error for the trial court to proceed with the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary attachment.

Davao Light v. Court of Appeals

Facts

The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12 May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of the defendants.

Issue

Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

Held

Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Ratio Decidendi
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of time between the commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose of the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his properties before the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it. In any case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is matched by the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a preliminary attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though validly issued, is not binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is first acquired.

Bernabe v. Vergara

Facts

Victoriano Zafra ("Victoriano") died, survived by three (3) children, namely, Benito ("Benito"), Apolonia ("Apolonia"), and Dominga ("Dominga"), all surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia are both deceased and their heirs instituted an action for partition of Victoriano's estate. The defendants in the said action were Dominga and certain persons to whom she had sold her share of the estate. In her answer, Dominga interposed a counterclaim that she had paid certain debts that had been contracted by Apolonia, which constitutes an equitable lien on Apolonia's estate. The trial court rendered a judgment awarding the heirs of Apolonia a third of Victoriano's estate and at the same time, ordered them to pay Apolonia's debts amounting to Php 350.00. The heirs of Apolonia now question the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the payment of the Php 350.00.

Issue

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to order the heirs of Apolonia the Php 350.00.

Held

Yes. The trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case, but the issue of jurisdiction over the issue must be remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination.

Ratio Decidendi

The trial court had jurisdiction as there was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded. Also, the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance, wherein debts left by deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties. In any case, the heirs of Apolonia failed to object to the exercise of jurisdiction of the trial court and the same court ruled upon the issue of jurisdiction by implication when it tried and decided on the case.

As the case involves an amount of Php 200 or more, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (CFI). The issue thus raised is not one of subject matter, but one of issue. The difference between the two has been elucidated in the case of Reyes v. Diaz in which it was likewise ruled that the issue of jurisdiction over the issues is not a matter properly reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Shaffer v. Heitner

Facts

Arnold Heitner ("Heitner") owned a share of stock in Greyhound Corporation ("the corporation"), which was incorporated in Delaware. He instituted a derivative suit in Delaware against 28 of the corporation's officers, most of whom reside outside the state, for causing the corporation to perform acts which eventually led to it incurring substantial anti-trust liabilities. In connection with the said suit, Heitner filed a motion to have the shares of the defendant officers in the corporation sequestered. None of the concerned certificates of stock were physically in Delaware. Nevertheless, Delaware law provides that the said certificates shall be deemed within the said state as it was the state of incorporation.

Service of notice was effected by registered mail to the defendant officers' last known addresses and by publication in a newspaper. The defendant officers objected, arguing that the mode of service denied them of due process and that they did not have sufficient contacts with Delaware so as to justify the said state's exercise of jurisdiction over them.

Issue

Whether or not the Delaware has jurisdiction over the defendant officers by virtue of their ownership of stock of a Delaware corporation.

Held

No. There is no sufficient contacts between the forum state and the defendants.

Ratio Decidendi

Mere ownership of property within a state does not justify that state's automatic assumption of personal jurisdiction over a party. The shares of stock held by the defendant officers is not the subject matter of the suit. Further, the cause of action underlying the suit is not related to the said shares. Heitner's argument that Delaware, being the state of incorporation, has a strong interest in the supervision of the corporation and therefore, jurisdiction over its officers as corporate fiduciaries deserve little consideration. Delaware law bases its jurisdiction not on the status of the defendant officers as corporate fiduciaries, but on the presence of their property in the said state. In any case, if the argued strong interest did exist, then the Delaware Legislature would have enacted a statute establishing such jurisdiction. Moreover, Heitner's contention that fairness dictates that the defendant officers be made accountable for misusing benefits given to them by Delaware law is untenable. It does not demonstrate that the defendant officers deliberately took advantage of the said privileges within Delaware so as to justify the exercise of the said state's jurisdiction over them. The defendant officers were not required to acquire their respective shares in order to hold their position. Mere acquisition of the said interests within a state is not a waiver of their rights to be sued only in states where they have minimum contacts.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank

Facts

The Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ("the bank"), which is based in New York, pooled together 113 small trusts into one large common trust fund pursuant to Section 100-c of the New York State Banking Law. It thereafter filed a Petition before a New York court to settle its first account in connection with the common trust fund. Under Section 100-c of the New York State Banking Law, the only notice required to be given to the beneficiaries of the trusts making up the common trust fund was a publication in a local newspaper. Kenneth Mullane ("Mullane"), who was appointed as a special guardian and attorney for those parties known or unknown who had any interest in the income of the fund, objected to the adequacy of the publication in affording the defendants due process.

Issue

Whether or not publication is sufficient notice.

Held

No. Notice by publication is not adequate notice in the present case.

Ratio Decidendi

The means used in the service of notice must be reasonably certain to actually inform the affected parties. The means used in the service of notice must be reasonably certain to inform those who are affected. If such means are not possible, then the alternate means adopted must not be substantially less likely to inform the concerned parties. A large number of cases brought before the court on the issue of notice involves those served by publication. In any, case, the bank has a record of the names and addresses of the income beneficiaries. It has not been shown that the bank has made any serious effort to inform the said beneficiaries personally of the settlement proceedings through the said addresses.

Pennoyer v. Neff

Facts:

Marcus Neff ("Neff"), a resident of California, hired John H. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an Oregon lawyer. Mitchell subsequently sued Neff before a state court in Oregon to collect $300.00 in unpaid attorney's fees. Summons were served upon Neff by publication in an Oregon newspaper. Neff failed to appear in court to defend his interests. Consequently, the court rendered a default judgment against Neff. At the time the judgment was rendered, Neff did not own any property in Oregon. However, he was eventually granted a landholding in the said state. To satisfy the judgment, the court ordered the seizure and auction of the landholding owned by Neff. Sylvester Pennoyer won in the auction. Neff then instituted an action to recover his property before a federal court in Oregon on the ground that the state court did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

Issue:

Whether or not the state court acquired jurisdiction over Neff.

Held:

No. Since the suit is one in personam, the service of summons upon the defendant through publication is not enough for the state court to acquire jurisdiction over him. Moreover, the defendant's property must have been brought under court custody at the commencement of the suit.

Ratio Decidendi:

In rem and in personam suits distinguished; Substituted service by publication ineffective in actions in personam. Substituted service by publication is valid only in suits which are in rem in character, or those actions in which the jurisdiction pertains to the property. However, in suits which are in personam, or those actions which seek to determine only the personal rights and obligations of the defendant, substituted service by publication is ineffectual for any purpose. Legal processes within one state cannot be effective in another state. Neither service by publication within the state nor extra-territorial service will cure this.

Jurisdiction over a non-resident dependent on the presence of his or her property within the forum state. A state does not have jurisdiction over a non-resident who does not have any property within its territorial jurisdiction since the court's jurisdiction over the defendant is only incidental to its jurisdiction over the property. Hence, for a suit against a non-resident to prosper, he or she must have property within the forum state which must brought under the control of the court at the beginning of the suit. Otherwise, the judgment is void and cannot be rendered valid thought the subsequent acquisition of property within the forum state by the defendant. Furthermore, if the n0n-resident's property is not immediately seized, the defendant could easily frustrate the suit by disposing of the said property.