Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. v. Tan

Facts

On 28 August 1996, a vehicular accident occurred on the Davao-Agusan Road in Davao City in which a truck owned by the Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. ("MRCMI") rear-ended a car owned by the spouses Manuel and Annie Tan ("the Tan spouses"). Consequently, the Tan spouses demanded reimbursement from the MRCMI of the costs for the repair of their vehicle. The MRCMI, however, refused to pay.

Consequently, the Tan spouses sued the MRCMI for damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City. During trial, the parties present two (2) different versions of how the accident transpired. The Tan spouses alleged that their car was stopped in traffic along with other vehicles when the MRCMI's truck crashed into its rear portion. On the other hand the MRCMI asserted that the Tan spouses' car suddenly cut in front of its truck, which was unable to stop in time as a result.

Ruling of the Trial Court: After trial, the MTCC awarded the Tan spouses PhP 83,750.00 for the damage done to their vehicle; PhP 15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of the suit.

Ruling of the Appellate Courts: Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Davao City and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the ruling of the MTCC.

Hence, the MRCMI file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issues

(1) [Remedial Law] Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy; and

(2) [Torts and Damages] Whether or not the MRCMI is liable for treble costs.

Held

(1) No. The case under consideration does not raise purely questions of law.

(2) Yes. The present action is a frivolous suit justifying the imposition of treble costs.

Ratio

(1) Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that petitions for certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.

In the present case, the matter elevated for review was the determination of the real cause of the collision between the Tan spouses' car and the MRCMI's truck, which is a question of fact, not of law. Jurisprudence has recognized a number of exceptions to Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, including when:

1. The findings of the lower courts are ground entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

2. Inferences made by the lower courts are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

3. There is grave abuse of discretion;

4. The judgment of the lower courts is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. The factual determinations of the lower courts are conflicting;

6. In making its findings, the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case or such findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;

7. The findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

8. The factual findings made by the lower courts were made without citation of the specific evidence on which they are made;

9. The facts set forth in the Petition, as well as in the Petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the Respondent;

10. The findings of fact are based on a supposed lack of evidence, which are in fact present;

11. The lower courts overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

(2) Rule 142, Section 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 3. Cost when appeal frivolous. — Where an action or appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble cost may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.

A frivolous appeal is one where no error can be brought before the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and the arguments of error are totally bereft of merit, or which is prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change. It is frivolous, too, when it does not present any justiciable question, or is one so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can succeed.

In the present case all three (3) lower courts unanimously upheld the police report placing the responsibility for the collision on the part of the MRCMI. However, despite its obvious fault, the MRCMI insisted on pressing its case, to the point of elevating the factual question of liability to the Supreme Court. Hence, the action was frivolous and award of treble costs is in order.

Other instances when the court may award treble costs include:

1. To stress dislike for "any scheme to prolong litigation" or for "an unwarranted effort to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at;";

2. To sanction an appeal that was obviously interposed "for the sole purpose of delay;"

3. To disapprove of the party’s "lack of good and honest intentions, as well as the evasive manner by which it was able to frustrate the adverse party’s claim for a decade;"

4. To stifle a party’s deplorable propensity to "go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court" and thereby to cause the case to drag "for far too long with practically no end in sight;"

5. To condemn the counsel’s frantic search for "any ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause;" and

6. To reiterate that a litigant, although his right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, is not permitted to initiate similar suits once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, in the hope of securing a favorable ruling "for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice."

US v. Dorr

Facts

Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of the aforementioned acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as "rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt".

Issue

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292.

Held

No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi

N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion.

As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the  Civil Commission and some of its individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292.

Buaya v. Polo

Facts:

Solemnidad M. Buaya ("Buaya") was an agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC). Audit of her account revealed that she failed to remit insurance premiums amounting to Php 358,850.72. Consequently, she was charged with estafa before Branch XIX of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The information against her states that, "That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation..."

Buaya filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Her motion for reconsideration being similarly denied, Buaya filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.


Arguments of the Petitioner

Buaya argues that the funds she allegedly embezzled were collected in Cebu City. Hence, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case.


Issue

Whether or not the Manila RTC had jurisdiction to try the case.


Held

Yes. The information filed against Buaya alleges that the crime was committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines". Moreover, damage to CBIC, an essential element of estafa, took place in Manila.


Ratio

In the case of People v. Mission (87 Phil. 641), the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after trial. In relation to this, Rule 110, Section 14 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in criminal prosecutions, the action must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense or any of the essential elements of the same took place.

Moreover, estafa is a continuing or transitory crime which may be prosecuted in any place where any of its essential elements took place. Damage or prejudice to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. In this case, the damage or prejudice done to the CBIC took place in its principal office, which is in Manila.

Annesley v. Annesley

Facts

Sybil Annesley ("Annesley"), a British subject, was married to a British domiciliary. The spouses resided in France until the death of the husband. Annesley remained in France without taking the steps set forth under French law for the formal acquisition of domicile in that country and seldom returned to Britain until her death. She left a will executed in France but in British form bequeathing her estate to her daughter. By French law, Annesley is not a domiciliary of France, but by British law, Annesley is a domiciliary of France. By the laws of France, the estate of Annesley is governed by the laws of her nationality, but by the laws of Britain, the estate of Annesley is governed by the laws of the domicile. French law only allows the testator to freely dispose of one-third of her estate.

Issue

Whether or not the succession is governed by French law.

Held

Yes. French law governs.

Ratio

Notwithstanding the lack of a formal French domicile, Annesley is a French domiciliary by British law given the concurrence of actual residence in a foreign jurisdiction coupled with the intent to remain there.  Thus, French law refers the matter to English law which, in turn, will refer the matter back to French law. Consequently, in these circumstances, French law dictates that French courts will apply the domestic law. Hence, French law governs the succession and Annesley may only dispose of one-third of her estate.

Aznar v. Garcia

Facts

Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the testator to dispose of his estate in any manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that the personal property of a person is governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed the project of partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed in the project deprived her of her legitime.

Issue

Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

Held

Yes. Philippine law governs.

Ratio

Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.

In Re: Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster

Facts
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the India passed a law giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster. As thus, the Indian government filed a complaint before a New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality. The district court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court, provided it complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in India. The UCC appealed the conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant
While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards of due process much lower than that followed in the US. Hence, US courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held
Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who have revoked their representation by an American counsel in favor of the Indian government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and evidence are likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian courts as alternate fora. The second is problematic as it gives the impression that foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of the Indian courts to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a judgment rendered by a foreign court may be enforced in that State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of Indian courts is untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of due process may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties must be given equal access to evidence in each other's possession. Hence, both parties maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

Heine v. New York Life Insurance Company

Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance companies") were corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to agree to be supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may be served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US and Germany for the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff
As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice but to try the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the insurance companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to great and unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of having to bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which arose from another jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.